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African swine fever (ASF) is caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV), which can cause
substantial morbidity and mortality events in swine. The virus can be transmitted via
direct and indirect contacts with infected swine, their products, or competent vector
species, especially Ornithodoros ticks. Africa and much of Eastern Europe are endemic
for ASF; a viral introduction to countries that are currently ASF free could have severe
economic consequences due to the loss of production from infected animals and the
trade restrictions that would likely be imposed as a result of an outbreak. We identified
vulnerabilities that could lead to ASFV introduction or persistence in the United States
or other ASF-free regions. Both legal and illegal movements of live animals, as well as
the importation of animal products, byproducts, and animal feed, pose a risk of virus
introduction. Each route is described, and current regulations designed to prevent ASFV
and other pathogens from entering the United States are outlined. Furthermore, existing
ASFV research gaps are highlighted. Laboratory experiments to evaluate multiple species
of Ornithodoros ticks that have yet to be characterized would be useful to understand
vector competence, host preferences, and distribution of competent soft tick vectors in
relation to high pig production areas as well as regions with high feral swine (wild boar
or similar) densities. Knowledge relative to antigenic viral proteins that contribute to host
response and determination of immune mechanisms that lead to protection are foundational in the quest for a vaccine. Finally, sampling of illegally imported and confiscated
wild suid products for ASFV could shed light on the types of products being imported
and provide a more informed perspective relative to the risk of ASFV importation.
Keywords: African swine fever, viral introduction, emergency preparedness, surveillance, domestic pigs, feral
swine

KEY POINTS
• African swine fever (ASF) is caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV), which is the only known
arthropod-borne DNA virus.
• Currently, ASF is not present in the United States, but it is a high consequence, foreign, notifiable
swine disease, and the economic consequences associated with an introduction could be catastrophic.
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• The virus is endemic in many parts of the world, including
most of sub-Saharan Africa, the island of Sardinia, and parts
of the Caucasus region and Eastern Europe.
• The routes of concern for the introduction of ASF into the
United States are the legal or illegal importation of live animals
(or their products) or a bioterrorism event.
• Introduction or spillover events from domestic swine into
feral swine populations would substantially complicate the
eradication process as would infection in native Ornithodoros
tick species.
• Currently, there is no ASF vaccine approved for use.
• Future research should involve (1) laboratory feeding
experiments to evaluate multiple species of North American
Ornithodoros ticks that have yet to be characterized,
(2) expanded analyses to explore the distribution and host
preferences of competent soft tick vectors in relation to
high pig production regions as well as high densities of feral
swine, (3) characterization of antigenic viral proteins that
contribute to a host immune response and determination of
immune mechanisms that lead to protection, (4) expanding
classical swine fever slaughter surveillance and random blood
collections to include screening for ASFV, in the event of an
increased risk of viral introduction, and (5) sampling of wild
suid products that were illegally imported and confiscated for
the detection of ASFV.

of genes used for virulence, immune evasion, and cell process
modulation (4). Twenty-three genotypes have been described
based on the partial sequences of the p72 gene (5, 6). All 23 genotypes are present in Africa, whereas only genotypes I and II have
been found outside of that continent. The virus primarily infects
cells of the mononuclear phagocytic system (monocytes and
macrophages) and replicates in the cytoplasm. The endoplasmic
reticulum is believed to play an important role in viral assembly
and ASFV envelopment (3, 4, 7).

TRANSMISSION AND CLINICAL DISEASE
African swine fever virus can be transmitted via direct
contact with infected animals, either domestic swine or wild
boar, indirect contact via contaminated fomites or uncooked
meat from infected animals, or through arthropod vectors,
particularly soft tick species in the genus Ornithodoros (1, 8).
The virus is highly stable in proteinaceous environments and
quite resistant to high temperatures, requiring 60°C for 20 min
for inactivation. Domestic pig-to-pig transmission is thought
to occur primarily through infection of the upper respiratory
tract as domestic pigs have been shown to shed infectious
virus from all secretions and excretions, with particularly high
concentrations in the oronasal fluid. ASFV is very persistent
in blood and tissues after death; thus, an opportune vehicle to
transmit infection is feeding uncooked swill. Environmental
contamination following necropsies, pig fights that result in
bloodshed, or bloody diarrhea following infection may also
serve as a route for new infections. Airborne transmission has
been demonstrated in a laboratory setting where animals were
densely housed (9).
Ornithodoros ticks have also been found to serve as biological
vectors for ASFV, with documented transstadial, transovarial,
and sexual transmission (10). In some regions of Africa, ASFV
cycles between juvenile common warthogs and Ornithodoros
porcinus porcinus ticks, which inhabit their burrows. In Europe,
Ornithodoros erraticus have been found to vector ASFV and were
involved in the disease epidemiology on the Iberian Peninsula
between the 1960s and 1990s; however, O. erraticus are not
involved in the current ASF scenario in Eastern Europe and
Sardinia. Biting flies, particularly Stomoxys spp, have been found
to be capable of mechanical transmission for ASFV (11).
Domestic swine, Eurasian wild boar, warthogs, bushpigs,
and giant forest hogs are all susceptible to infection with
ASFV; however, warthogs and bushpigs generally develop
asymptomatic infections and serve as a viral reservoir, in
what is often referred to as the sylvatic cycle (12). Peccaries
are thought to be resistant to infection. Neonatal warthogs
develop a sufficient viremia to infect new ticks but do not
develop clinical disease, and adult warthogs are impervious
to the pathogenic effects of the virus although the virus can
be often extracted from their lymph nodes (13). ASFV has
a predilection for lymph nodes near the head, and warthogs
remain infected for life (14). Neither horizontal nor vertical
transmission has been documented in warthogs, with soft ticks
serving as the sole route of transmission between infected and
susceptible warthogs (1, 15, 16). Sexual transmission is not

INTRODUCTION
African swine fever (ASF), first described in Africa in the
1920s, is caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV). Infection
results in high morbidity and mortality in swine and has drastic
implications for global domestic swine production (1). This
disease is reportable to the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE), and viral infection in swine can have severe
economic consequences associated with production losses,
trade limitations, and eradication programs (2). Currently, the
United States is ASFV free. This article outlines what is known
about ASFV and aims to describe existing gaps in knowledge.
Finally, a summary of US vulnerabilities for viral introduction
and persistence is provided. Countries with endemic ASF in
domestic swine likely have a different set of challenges compared to the United States and other ASF-free regions and may
benefit from the development of disease control methods that
are commonly used, such as enforceable quarantine zones,
diagnostic assays, and culling of infected animals. However,
eradicating a disease that is established in a wild population,
such as wild boar, is highly complex and depends on a deep
understanding of the disease ecology within a specific epidemiological context.

VIRUS DESCRIPTION
African swine fever virus is a large, enveloped virus in the
Asfarviridae family that causes hemorrhagic diseases in domestic
pigs and several species of wild swine (3). The virus is a genetically complex double-stranded DNA virus that contains a series
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GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION AND
EPIDEMIOLOGY

indicated in warthogs; however, the virus is found in genital
secretions and so it remains a possibility (1). To date, there
has been no conclusive data suggesting a long-term carrier
state; however, a survey conducted in central Kenya found
ASFV [detected via polymerase chain reaction (PCR)] in
asymptomatic domestic swine and warthogs (17).
Experimental infection of bushpigs demonstrated the
absence of clinical disease despite a robust viremia lasting
35–91 days following infection with ASFV, which was sufficient
to infect O. porcinus porcinus ticks that fed on the bushpigs
during their viremic period (18). Infected ticks were able
to transmit ASFV to naive domestic pigs. Certain strains of
ASFV in experimentally inoculated bushpigs were capable of
transmission via direct contact with domestic swine, whereas
other strains were not. Infected domestic swine were not able
to transmit the infection to in-contact bushpigs, suggesting that
they are not as readily infected via direct contact compared to
domestic swine.
Clinical disease can manifest in multiple ways ranging
from death with no signs (peracute, mortality ~100%) to an
asymptomatic infection; however, most isolates of ASFV cause
acute hemorrhagic fever in domestic pigs and result in mortality nearing 100% (1, 19). All age groups of pigs have been found
to be equally susceptible to ASFV infection, as opposed to
classical swine fever virus (CSFV) where young pigs are much
more susceptible (20). Acute infections are caused by highly
virulent strains and are typically characterized by a high fever,
anorexia, lethargy, weakness, recumbancy, diarrhea and/or
constipation, abdominal pain, hemorrhagic signs, respiratory
distress, nasal and conjunctival discharge, and abortions in
pregnant females. Death often occurs within 7–10 days after
the onset of clinical signs. Depending on the virulence of
the ASFV strain, acute infections are often the predominant
form at the beginning of an outbreak in disease-free regions;
however, once established, the disease often progresses to
subacute clinical forms that can be sustained over time (20).
It is important to note that this pattern has been previously
observed although it is not the established truth. Moderately
virulent strains result in subacute infection (often with high
mortality in young animals and much lower mortality in older
animals) where the clinical signs often include abortion, fever,
and transient hemorrhaging with death or recovery occurring
within 3–4 weeks. Chronic infections (mortality is very low)
are characterized by intermittent or low fever, appetite loss, and
depression and, in some instances, result in a fatal infection.
Animals that remain persistently infected for months, such as
survivors or subclinically or chronically infected pigs, may play
a role in disease persistence in endemic regions. Also, it has
been speculated that they may contribute to sporadic outbreaks
and introductions to ASFV-free zones (20).
Domestic pigs are most infectious during the incubation
period and may shed virus for >48 hours prior to the presentation
of clinical disease (1). Recovered pigs may shed infectious virus
for 1 month after the disappearance of clinical signs. Pig populations that have developed a degree of resistance to the virus are
better able to maintain and circulate ASFV as the disease is not
self-limiting (21, 22).
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African swine fever was restricted to the African continent from
its first description in the 1920s until 1957 when an outbreak was
reported in Portugal (23). This outbreak was effectively controlled
and eradicated until a second recurrence in 1960, which resulted
in ASF being endemic in the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal and
Spain) until 1995. During the 1970s and 1980s, ASF emerged in
several parts of the world, including other European countries
(the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Belgium) and the Americas
(Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Brazil) (16). This
global spread is thought to be due largely to feeding domestic
animals contaminated pork products that entered each region via
international air and seaports. After establishment in domestic
swine herds, infected pigs and pork products became the primary
source of infection.
On the basis of the ability of ASFV to be transmitted via direct
and indirect contacts and through an arthropod vector, SánchezVizcaíno et al. (23) outline five epidemiological scenarios and
examples of regions where each type of situation occurred,
depending on the existence of wild reservoirs and competent tick
vectors. The first scenario involves the original natural cycle and
describes transmission in Eastern and Southern Africa in which a
sylvatic cycle occurs between wild suids, especially warthogs, and
O. porcinus porcinus ticks. Spillover into domestic swine is typically associated with infected tick bites or ingestion of contaminated warthog meat. A second scenario describes transmission
occurring primarily through direct contact between infected and
susceptible domestic pigs and indirect contact between susceptible pigs and contaminated pork products. Ticks are not involved.
This describes ASF dynamics in many West African countries.
Third, as was observed on the Iberian Peninsula, both wild boar
and domestic pigs were infected, and transmission primarily
occurred via direct contact between infected and susceptible
animals and via the consumption of infected meat. O. erraticus
contributed to transmission in outdoor production systems;
however, this tick species is only capable of transstadial transmission but not transovarial, and therefore, their vector competency
is lower than O. porcinus porcinus. Between 1968 and 1980 in
Central and South America, a fourth scenario was observed in
which the disease only affected domestic pigs and neither wild
suids nor ticks were involved. This scenario is much easier to
eradicate compared to all others. The fifth scenario occurred in
Russia and the trans-Caucasian countries where both wild boar
and domestic pigs were involved in transmission but ticks were
not found to be involved. Most outbreaks were found in domestic
pigs and were linked to movements of affected animals and their
products. Understanding the epidemiology of disease, specific to
the region of interest, is crucial as the development of emergency
control and eradication plans are dependent upon disease transmission patterns and risk factors.

IMMUNE RESPONSE TO ASFV
Infection with ASFV is characterized by severe immunosuppression and apoptosis, primarily replicating in monocytes and
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macrophages, and is believed to enter cells via receptor-mediated
endocytosis (24, 25). Activated macrophages release IL-1, IL-6,
and TNFα, which all contribute to acute-phase reactions, inflammation, activation of endothelial cells, and apoptosis (26). Similar
cell tropism and organ distribution have been observed across all
strains of ASFV; however, more severe tissue destruction is associated with strains of increasing virulence. Neutralizing antibodies and CD8+ T cells and natural killer cells are believed to play
an important role in the host immune response against ASFV.
In vitro experiments suggest that some cellular mechanisms are
regulated by ASFV via the encoding of specific regulatory genes
and by interaction with viral and cellular proteins; however,
most cellular functions altered after infection remain unknown
(25). Proteomic evaluation demonstrated that ASFV shuts down
the majority of protein synthesis, affecting approximately 65%
of cellular proteins. Specific cellular proteins were found to be
overexpressed after ASFV infection, and most were involved in
redox homeostasis, programmed cell death, and coagulation.
The role of neutralizing antibodies has been evaluated, and
results are variable. Passive transfer experiments performed in
domestic swine by Onisk et al. (27) found that 85% of pigs that
received the anti-ASFV IgG survived challenge compared to 0%
of unimmunized controls. Treated animals underwent transient
fever but otherwise appeared clinically normal. Viremia in pigs
that received the antibody transfer was found to be delayed and
reduced.
Viral neutralizing epitopes were identified on three viral
capsid proteins—p30, p54, and p72—and domestic swine were
immunized using a baculovirus expressing each of these proteins
prior to challenge with a homologous virus (28). Immunized
animals were found to have a 2-day delay in the onset of clinical
disease and a reduced viremia, but there was no effect on disease
development, progression, or outcome. The authors concluded
that neutralizing antibodies to these ASFV proteins are insufficient for antibody-mediated protection.
The findings by Onisk et al. (27) and Neilan et al. (28) appear
to be in stark contrast to one another, and differences are believed
to be due in part to variations in virus strains (and subsequently,
virulence) and challenge doses. The relative role of neutralizing
antibodies may be dependent on the virulence of the ASFV isolate
used, with neutralizing antibodies providing a more protective
response against less virulent strains. However, large differences
in study design between the two experiments make comparison
very difficult as Onisk and colleagues used passive transfer, which
is a mixture of numerous antibodies compared to Neilan et al.
(28) who immunized swine with specific epitopes. Much further
characterization of the role of antibodies is required.
Interestingly, in northern Mozambique, a region endemic for
ASF, a population of domestic pigs were found to have high levels
of circulating antibodies to ASFV (29). A group of pigs from
this population were collected and their offspring were evaluated through experimental ASFV challenge for the heritability
of this resistance to ASF. The offspring were acutely susceptible
to challenge with a virulent strain of ASFV, suggesting that the
ASFV resistance in the parental population was not heritable.
The authors hypothesize that this observed resistance is resultant
from (1) prior exposure to a less virulent but antigenically similar
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field virus prior to exposure to a virulent strain, (2) maternal
antibody resistance, (3) exposure to small quantities of infectivity
that may result in a sublethal infection that confers immunity to
a subsequent challenge (29).

VECTOR BIOLOGY
As stated previously, several soft tick species have been implicated
in ASFV transmission in endemic and outbreak regions. It is
important to note that the taxonomy of the O. porcinus porcinus
ticks has changed over time on the basis of both morphological
and biological characteristics. Prior to 1979, O. porcinus porcinus
ticks were often referred to as Ornithodoros moubata porcinus
or simply Ornithodoros moubata. The O. moubata complex was
then split into four distinct species, including Ornithodoros
porcinus, which was further divided into O. porcinus porcinus and
Ornithodoros porcinus domesticus (30). However, in much of the
current literature O. moubata and O. porcinus porcinus are used
interchangeably.
Plowright et al. (31) demonstrated that O. porcinus porcinus
could be infected with multiple strains of ASFV and develop
a persistent infection although the minimum infective dose
varied between strains. Furthermore, experimental challenges
confirmed that infected ticks could readily transmit ASFV to
domestic pigs. Later studies determined that O. porcinus porcinus
could transmit the infection transovarially; however, there was
tremendous variability between egg batches from different ticks
and between successive egg batches from the same tick (32).
Interestingly, it was found that the prevalence of infected eggs
increases after each successive infected blood meal. O. porcinus
porcinus ticks have been found to maintain high ASFV titers
over time, and no cytopathological lesions have been observed in
these ticks, suggesting that O. porcinus porcinus ticks and ASFV
are co-adapted and likely represent a co-evolved system (33).
ASFV follows a common virus–tick pathway upon ingestion of an
infective blood meal, viral replication in the midgut, escape into
the hemocoel, and infection of the coxal and salivary glands (34).
While O. porcinus porcinus ticks are involved in the sylvatic
cycle of ASFV with warthogs, other Ornithodoros species are
capable of transmitting infection. O. erraticus, found in the
Mediterranean and Middle East, was implicated in ASFV transmission, and longitudinal monitoring found higher titers over
time, which is suggestive of viral replication (35).
Several Ornithodoros species are indigenous to North and
Central America, as well as the Caribbean. Experimental infec
tions in Ornithodoros coriaceus, Ornithodoros parkeri, and
Ornithodoros turicata (Americas) and Ornithodoros puertoricensis (Caribbean) have been performed with multiple ASFV
isolates (33). O. coriaceus ticks were infected with five different
isolates of ASFV, and viral persistence was found to range
between 77 and 463 days, with transmission to domestic swine
demonstrated at 502 days postinfection with the DR II strain.
O. parkeri were challenged with one strain of ASFV and found
to be infected for 46 days postinfection, whereas O. turicata were
found to be infected for 23 days postinfection. O. puertoricensis
ticks were infected with a single isolate of ASFV and demonstrated transmission to domestic pigs at 239 days postinfection.
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In addition, transovarial and transstadial transmission were
demonstrated; however, transmission rates decreased with each
molt. Importantly, despite the presence of O. puertoricensis in
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, it did not appear to complicate ASFV eradication in 1978, likely due to the lack of contact
between infected pigs and ticks (36). For a comprehensive
overview of vector competency with different isolates of ASFV,
please see the study by Kleiboeker and Scoles (33).

the most important risk estimator for ASF spread into diseasefree EU countries is wild boar habitat and the least significant
estimator is wild boar density; thus, indicating that the presence
of wild boar is more important than density (45). This model
can be used to identify countries that are at higher risk for ASF
introduction through wild boar.
Experimental inoculation of wild boar with an ASFV isolate
from the Caucasus region found that the infection resulted in
uniform lethality, and the authors concluded that this highly
virulent strain would be unsuitable for viral endemicity within
the native population of wild boar (46). Despite this assertion,
field observations show that the virus can persist independently
in wild boar despite high virulence. Importantly, a low-dose challenge of wild boar with Caucasus region isolates of ASFV were
found to be sufficient to result in infection of weak or runted
animals (47). Once infected, these poor-doing wild boar could
then serve to amplify ASFV to levels that were capable of infecting apparently healthy herd mates. The exact mechanism with
which highly virulent strains of ASFV are being maintained in
wild boar populations is unknown; however, in several epidemiological scenarios, it has become clear that ASFV can persist
independently in wild boar populations.
Competent vector species, namely O. erraticus ticks, found
on the Iberian Peninsula also contribute to difficulty eradicating
the virus once introduced. Portugal was declared free of ASFV
in 1993, but the virus re-emerged on a single farm in 1999 and
ASFV-infected O. erraticus ticks in 1993 are suggested as the
route of introduction (48). Ticks were collected from farms that
were depopulated due to ASF and evaluated for their capacity
to maintain an ASFV infection and transmit to susceptible
domestic swine. Cell culture was used to evaluate tick infection,
and four adult ticks were found to be positive using cell culture
alone and another six adult ticks were found to be positive
using both cell culture and PCR or direct immunofluorescence.
8.8% of tested farms were found to have infected ticks, and this
infection could lead to virus isolation 2.5–5.25 years following
the last possible ASFV exposure. Transmission to susceptible
domestic swine occurred 2.3 years after the last possible exposure to ASFV. These findings suggest that the current European
Administration regulations on ASF, where an infected property
can be restocked 40 days after an outbreak in the absence of soft
tick vectors, and the requirement of a 6-year quarantine if soft
tick vectors are present, are appropriate (49). Furthermore, it is
a distinct possibility that long-lived ASFV-infected O. erraticus
ticks caused the single farm outbreak of ASF in 1999 after the
eradication in Portugal. However, it is important to note that this
finding was related to a very old and traditional housing of pigs,
using pig sties in which soft ticks could become established. By
using modern pig production methods, a soft tick infestation is
unlikely.

ASF AND EUROPEAN SPREAD
African swine fever is endemic in much of Africa but was first
introduced outside of the African continent into Portugal in 1957
and again in 1960 (37). The most likely route of introduction was
via ASFV-contaminated swill as this is a very effective means
of spreading the virus over long distances. The disease was first
discovered in swill-fed swine near the Lisbon airport, which furthers the hypothesis that the virus was introduced via this route.
ASFV then spread to Spain and remained endemic on the Iberian
Peninsula until the 1990s. Once introduced, ASF is especially difficult to eradicate due to the presence of wildlife reservoirs and
competent soft tick vectors, the lack of a vaccine, and insufficient
laboratory support for rapid and accurate diagnosis (38). It is
important to note that the role of wild boar in the maintenance
and transmission of ASFV varies significantly based on disease
epidemiology and ecology. Wild boars were involved to some
extent in the epidemiology of ASF on the Iberian Peninsula, but
they did not appear to complicate control measures, which is in
strict contrast to the current scenario in Eastern Europe where
ASF has become established in wild boar populations independent of domestic pigs (39). Between 1960 and 1986, the disease
emerged in a variety of European countries, including France,
Madeira, Italy, including the island of Sardinia, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Malta (37, 40, 41). Extensive control has led
to eradication in these countries, except for Sardinia, where the
disease has been endemic since 1978 (20).
In June 2007, ASFV was introduced to the Caucasus region
of Georgia, presumably from catering waste containing infected
meat from ships docked at the Black Sea Port of Poti (38). The
virus spread quickly throughout the country and by July 2007,
ASFV was found in 56 of the 61 districts in Georgia. By August
2007, ASF was found in neighboring Armenia and by November
2007 was found in Azerbaijan and Russia. In 2014, outbreaks
were reported in parts of the European Union, including Poland,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and the first detections in each of
these countries were in wild boar found dead (42). Epidemiological
investigations from Lithuania and Latvia suggest that fresh grass
and seeds contaminated with ASFV from infectious wild boar
served as the source of infection for pigs on backyard farms (43).
The viral amplification in backyard pigs then served as a viral
source for other backyard farms and commercial piggeries. In
2017, ASF was reported in the Czech Republic and Romania,
and between January and September 2017, the Animal Disease
Notification System received notifications of about 3,700 cases in
wild boar and approximately 140 cases in domestic swine from
the 6 EU member states, including Sardinia (44). Interestingly,
models of the most current epidemiological situation suggest that

Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org

DOMESTIC SWINE IN THE UNITED
STATES
The overwhelming majority of the 65 million pigs in the United
States are managed indoors under high biosecurity conditions.
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Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of pig production within
the United States from 2012 (50), with Iowa, North Carolina,
Minnesota, Illinois, and Indiana being the five top pork producing states annually. Commercial swine production is a closed
system from farrowing through slaughter as a means to reduce
the risk of pathogen introduction (Personal communication,
2016). Animal feed, transport vehicles, personnel, and other
fomites are also closely managed to limit cross-contamination.
However, it is important to note that despite the biosecurity
measures in place in the commercial swine industry, porcine
epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) entered the United States
in 2013, and epidemiological analyses suggest that transport
equipment contributed to viral spread (51). Moreover, in
summer 2014 in northeast Lithuania, ASFV was introduced
to an industrial pig farm that was intensively managed with a
closed cycle and very strict biosecurity measures resulting in
the death or euthanasia of >20,000 pigs (20). These examples

demonstrate that despite stringent biosecurity protocols and a
vertically integrated industry, it can still be difficult to control
pathogens.
For ASF vector-borne transmission, however, it is unlikely
that ticks would interact with domestic swine raised in commercial facilities. However, hobbyists and backyard farmers
often have domestic swine that are not managed with intensive
biosecurity and thus are likely to be exposed to environmental elements and other domestic livestock, wildlife species,
or their feral counterparts (52). Exposure to potential soft
tick vectors and other blood feeding arthropods is plausible
depending on both the geographical region and the management practice. Given these conditions, an ASF introduction
into the United States may put backyard farms more at risk
compared to commercial facilities, as has been reported in
much of Eastern Europe and some European Union member
states (e.g., Latvia) (43).

Figure 1 | Distribution of pig production within the United States, 2012. (Figure courtesy by United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics
Service (2015), used with permission.)
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DIAGNOSTICS

gene is also highly conserved and deletion was found to result in
complete viral attenuation in swine (64). Vaccination with the
mutant strain followed by infection with a wild-type homologous
virus resulted in complete protection. Interestingly, however,
evaluation of anti-ASFV specific antibodies, ASFV-specific IFNγ
response, and circulating cytokine levels found that a complex
immune scenario dictates whether infection is established.
Furthermore, A238L is an ASFV immunomodulatory protein
that inhibits activation of the NFĸB and NFAT pathways, which
are responsible for regulating the synthesis of pro-inflammatory
cytokines (65). This protein is believed to be a potent immunosuppressor that may contribute to viral evasion of the host
immune response. Unsurprisingly, inoculation of pigs with
A238L mutant viruses demonstrated an increase in TNFα, a
potent pro-inflammatory cytokine. Much more work is needed
to determine whether immunization with viruses with altered
immunomodulatory proteins could be harnessed to assist the
host immune response against virulent challenge.
Recombinant protein vaccines have also been characterized
using a number of relevant viral proteins. p30 and p54 are
externally located and involved in virus attachment and virus
internalization, respectively (58). Immunization of domestic pigs
with either recombinant p54 or p30 proteins induced neutralizing
antibodies, but did not protect against lethal challenge and the
disease course was unaltered. Combination p54 and p30 vaccines produced both neutralizing antibodies and modified the
disease course resulting in a range of protection. Ivanov et al. (66)
evaluated 46 peptides that mimic viral proteins for their ability to
establish a protective immune response. Vaccination with some
combinations of these peptides was found to delay mortality in
domestic swine and warrants further investigation. A baculovirus
vector expressing the ASFV hemagglutinin was used as a vaccine, and all pigs survived challenge with a virulent virus after
immunization (67).
DNA vaccines have also been assessed as an option for ASF,
and partial protection was afforded in domestic swine using p54
and p30 as antigens on the construct (68). The robust activation
of CD8+ cells appears to be extremely important for protection.
Exposure to a non-virulent strain in Portugal (OURT88/3
genotype 1) followed by a virulent strain (OURT88/1 genotype 1)
conferred protection against challenge with virulent field isolates
from Africa (69). This immunization strategy protected most pigs
from both disease development and viremia. The cross-reactivity
of the various strains of ASFV can be measured using IFNγ
stimulatory assays and provide a strong correlation to the degree
of protection conferred.
In addition to evaluating new vaccine preparations, Blome
et al. (70) reassessed inactivated ASFV vaccination preparations
using modern adjuvants, specifically Polygen and Emulsigen D,
which are known to stimulate both humoral and cellular immune
responses, including IFNγ. The efficacy of inactivated ASFV vaccines was not improved, and no protection was observed after
vaccination followed by challenge with a homologous strain. In
fact, vaccinated animals submitted to the disease more quickly,
suggesting the possibility of antibody dependent enhancement.
Vaccine development for ASFV is ongoing and challenging
due to the range of genetic and antigenic variability as well as

Virus isolation can be used for the diagnosis of ASF as live virus
can be obtained from live animals or necropsy tissues although
this method is typically only used in reference laboratories to confirm diagnosis (53). The spleen, kidney, tonsils, and lymph nodes
are the best tissues for virus collection. Pig leukocyte cells, bone
marrow cultures, porcine alveolar macrophages, and porcine
blood monocytes can all be used in ASFV culture. Conventional
and real-time PCR have been developed for the detection of
ASFV, and multiple primer pairs have been developed to create
a rapid diagnostic tool (53–56). A strong IgG response has been
detected in domestic swine that survive infection with ASFV
(57). As such, serological assays can also be very useful, especially in endemic regions. ELISA, immunoblotting, and indirect
fluorescent antibody assays are the most common, and ELISA
followed by immunoblotting is often used for international trade
purposes.

VACCINES
It has been particularly challenging to develop an effective ASFV
vaccine. To date, no vaccine is available because of a number of
key factors, including the lack of identification of protective antigens, incomplete understanding of virus–host cell interactions,
and inadequate knowledge relative to the diversity of viral strains
currently circulating in natural reservoirs (58, 59). A number of
vaccine options have been tried with varying levels of success,
including using vaccines with naturally or experimentally deleted
genes, subunit vaccines based on recombinant proteins, and DNA
vaccines (23). However, none conferred complete protection.
A live attenuated vaccine strain was developed and was shown
to provide protection against a homologous strain challenge;
however, use on the Iberian Peninsula is believed to have been
the origin of some low virulence strains that induced a chronic
disease form of ASF during the 1960–1995 outbreak (23). Despite
this setback, live attenuated vaccines continue to be evaluated for
their protective capacity (60, 61).
Knockout ASFV mutants have been evaluated for efficacy
although findings have been inconsistent. Afonso et al. (62)
describe a highly conserved gene, referred to as NL, and found
that deletion of the gene from European pathogenic strains
resulted in complete attenuation of the virus in domestic swine.
NL-deleted mutants were created for two highly virulent African
strains of ASFV, and inoculation in domestic swine found that
these strains retained their virulence, irrespective of the absence
of NL. These findings suggest that NL gene function is not
required for these strains of ASFV and that NL gene deletion
alone is insufficient to engineer live attenuated ASFV vaccines.
Gene 9GL is highly conserved, and in vitro evaluation determined
that the protein encoded by this gene affects virion maturation
and viral growth in macrophage culture (63). The deletion of 9GL
resulted in growth-defective mutants in culture and was found
to be highly attenuated in domestic swine. Immunization with
a 9GL knockout virus followed by a challenge with a wild-type
ASFV strain resulted in complete protection, and this mutant is
being further evaluated as a vaccine candidate for ASFV. The 9GL
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the myriad of strategies utilized by the virus to evade the host’s
immune response. Further work is essential to develop a vaccine
that is both biosafe and provides a high degree of protection
across virulent ASFV strains. Subject matter experts believe
that live attenuated vaccines are the most promising candidates
in the short term due to their experimental successes; however,
more studies are required to confirm vaccine safety, capacity to
differentiate between naturally infected and vaccinated animals
(DIVA), and long-term efficacy (60).

domestic or feral swine and then presumably spillover into the
other population. Each of these possible routes of introduction
is described.

Legal Movement of Live Animals

Domestic swine are imported annually from Canada, and Table 1
summarizes the number of animals imported and their purpose.
Currently, Canada is ASFV free and, as such, the importation of
suids is unlikely to result in an ASFV introduction into the United
States.

ASF AND THE UNITED STATES

Legal Movement of Animal Products, Byproducts,
and Animal Feed

The introduction of ASFV into the United States could negatively
affect the domestic swine industry because of morbidity and
mortality, the associated losses in production, and restrictions on
interstate and international trade. The Foreign Animal Disease
Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP), Disease Response
Strategy: African Swine Fever put together by USDA APHIS
Veterinary Services (71) provides information relevant to all
aspects of a disease response in the United States in the event
of a viral incursion. The control and eradication strategies are
based on four epidemiological principles: (1) prevent contact
between ASFV and susceptible animals (primarily via quarantine
and restricted movement), (2) stop the production of ASFV by
infected and/or exposed animals, (3) stop vector transmission,
and (4) increase the disease resistance of susceptible animals to
ASFV. However, the primary control and eradication strategy are
predicated on stamping out (depopulation of clinically affected
and in-contact control susceptible swine). Currently, there is
no active surveillance being conducted in the United States for
ASF. The USDA FAD Prep Document provides information
for responders and stakeholders such that they understand the
disease agent. Furthermore, a stochastic risk assessment model
created by Herrera-Ibata et al. (72) determined the months of
highest risk, the origin of the imports of higher risk, and the US
states most vulnerable to an ASF introduction. This information
can be used to optimize surveillance plans and develop emergency response protocols to help reduce the impact of a potential
ASF introduction into the United States.

Animal products and byproducts as well as animal feed that are
imported into the United States all require permits upon entry.
Products and byproducts that are coming from ASF-endemic
regions must be treated in a manner that has previously demonstrated efficacy in destroying ASFV, typically involving heat,
pH, or fixation processes. Products and byproducts derived
from ASF-free countries can be imported in an unprocessed
form. Animal feed from ASF-endemic regions is required to be
cooked to a specific temperature and for a specified duration
before importation. Products coming from the European Union,
which is designated as a low-risk region, can be imported raw if
desired; however, documentation is required to certify that the
product is coming from an unaffected herd in an unrestricted
region.

Illegal Movement of Live Animals and Their Products

The US Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) is primarily responsible for the confiscation
of illegally imported products and specimens from domestic
livestock species. Data provided by CBP depict products and
specimens from domestic swine that were confiscated in the
cargo or express courier environment, which includes companies such as FedEx and DHL, or via international mail facilities,
including US postal service. Between calendar years 2012 and
2016, over 68,000 products and specimens derived from domestic
swine were confiscated by CBP. The continents of origin for the
majority of products and specimens confiscated by CBP are Asia
and Europe, which comprise 49 and 44% of the confiscations,
respectively. South America, Australia, Africa, and unknown
account for ≤1% each, and products and specimens confiscated

SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES
VULNERABILITIES FOR THE
INTRODUCTION OR PERSISTENCE
OF ASFV

Table 1 | Number and purpose of pigs that were imported into the United
States from Canada between years 2012 and 2016.

Risk of Introduction into the United States

Vergne et al. (73) evaluate the pathways for the potential introduction of ASF in China, which maintains over half of the global
pig population, and our risk assessment shows similar routes of
concern for virus introduction. The legal or illegal movement
of live animals or their products, byproducts, or animal feed, or
an intentional viral release in an act of bioterrorism comprise
the routes of highest concern for ASFV introduction into the
United States. It is important to note that to result in an outbreak
event, an imported ASFV would need to be released into a susceptible population. An initial outbreak event could occur in
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Purpose

Breeding
swine
Feeding
swine
Direct to
slaughter
Total

8

Number of animals imported
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

155,417

196,320

249,214

234,796

150,267

4,706,866

4,177,805

3,936,987

4,314,664

4,626,477

886,736

824,511

851,002

1,163,884

980,242

5,749,019

5,198,636

5,037,203

5,713,344

5,756,986

February 2018 | Volume 5 | Article 11

Brown and Bevins

Potential for the Introduction and Establishment of ASFV in the United States

from North America comprise 5%. These data are summarized
in Figure 2.
A large number of products and specimens were derived
from continents with regions that are enzootic for ASF. The exact
number of products and specimens that are smuggled across the
US border is difficult to ascertain, and it can be assumed that the
products and/or specimens discovered represent a small subset
of the types of goods that are illegally imported into the United
States. Due to the types of products confiscated and the regions
of the world from which they originate, the illegal importation of
domestic livestock products and specimens certainly pose a risk
for ASF introduction.
The US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible for the
confiscation of illegally imported wildlife; however, a 1994 report
from the Government Accountability Office estimated that 1–3%
of illegal wildlife shipments carried by passengers, and 1–10%
of illegally imported wildlife in declared cargo shipments are
detected (74). This problem is believed to be primarily a result
of a limited inspection workforce and budgetary restrictions
on overtime, such that ports of entry are often without inspector coverage. FWS provided data relative to wild suid product
confiscations in the United States between 2006 and 2016. The
types of wild suids from which products were illegally imported
and subsequently confiscated by US FWS agents can be found in
Figure 3. Warthog products are responsible for more than 60% of
confiscations followed by wild boar, bush pigs, unspecified swine
products, and babirusa; however, the sample size is small because
of the specific nature of the data (wild suids) and because not all
illegal imports are likely detected.
The majority of products seized by FWS in the United States
were those that originated on the continent of Africa (Figure 4).

Approximately 25% of confiscations were of products derived
from North and South America as well as unknown countries of
origin. Asia, Australia, and Europe comprised 13% of confiscations. A large proportion of all confiscated products were derived
from continents, which are endemic for ASFV (or unknown);
hence, illegal animal/animal product transport presents a risk for
ASFV introduction.

Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism is described as the intentional release or dissemi
nation of bacteria, viruses, or toxins that cause morbidity or
mortality events in humans, other animals, or plants. Due to the
tremendous value of the domestic swine industry in the United
States, the high morbidity and mortality associated with infection, the ease of viral spread due to the endemic status of many
countries globally, the stability of the virus in chilled and frozen
products, the safety for the individual(s) involved in the release as
the pathogen is not zoonotic, and the crippling economic effects
attendant with an introduction, ASFV is a potential candidate to
be released in an act of bioterrorism. This route of introduction
is difficult to prevent and as such spotlights the need for robust
surveillance systems in both domestic and feral swine to ensure
rapid detection and differential diagnosis.

Factors that Complicate Eradication
Efforts following Introduction

The risk of ASFV introduction to the United States is low
(72). Following a potential introduction, however, ASFV
establishment, even short-term establishment, is an open
question. ASF has never been found in the United States, but

Figure 2 | A pie chart depicting the continent of origin for the products confiscated by US Customs and Border Protection between 2012 and 2016 (n = 68,594).
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Figure 3 | Types of suids from which products were confiscated by the US Fish and Wildlife Services between 2006 and 2016 (n = 133).

Figure 4 | Number of wild suid specimens seized by the US Fish and Wildlife Service between 2006 and 2016 based on continent of origin (n = 133).

it has successfully taken hold in areas of introduction around
the world. Transmission cycles and viral ecology often differ
in different locations, demonstrating at least some flexibility
for the virus to persist in a range of climates, with or without
tick vector involvement, and with or without a wild suid
component (75). Climate would not limit ASFV establishment
in the United States, and there are tick species that could
potentially play a role in viral maintenance (76). The presence
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of backyard swine and feral swine could also aid in short-term
establishment similar to what has been seen elsewhere (43).
The biosecure nature of the US commercial swine industry
would likely detect and limit ASF transmission without longterm establishment, but economic consequences could still be
significant.
Feral swine, which are found in a large number of states,
present a risk because of their free-roaming behavior and
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omnivorous diets and, in the event of a viral incursion, would
likely contribute to amplification and transmission events to
other feral swine or their domestic counterparts. Soft tick species
in the Ornithodoros genus that are native to the United States also
present an element of complexity as their competence in a field
setting remains largely unknown but could substantially complicate viral persistence and disease eradication. These elements are
described in detail below.

Typically male feral swine live a solitary life, while reproductively active females live in small groups with their young,
referred to as sounders. Contact rates within and between
sounders have been studied using GPS devices, and not surprisingly, contact rates are much higher amongst members of the
same sounder compared to those between animals of different
sounders (82). However, it has further been shown that sounder
home ranges often overlap extensively (83). Sounder interaction
is reduced when sounders are separated at distances >2 km, and
as such, disease transmission is expected to be reduced between
sounders at this distance and nearly negligible between sounders
separated by >6 km. Based on these data, the quarantine radius
surrounding a positive premise is likely to be at least 2 km,
although feral swine activity would be but one factor to consider
when determining quarantine size. Certainly, other factors may
exist that lead to clustering, such as water availability or baiting
activities, among others. Lone boars have been shown to have
much larger home ranges compared to sounders and are far
more likely to move great distances (84). Furthermore, feral
swine densities should also be accounted for as movement may
be influenced by density.
Bait stations have been considered as an alternative to fencing
for containing feral pigs during culling activities; however, once
evaluated empirically, it was found that baiting is not a suitable
alternative as only 62% of feral swine trapped within proximity
of the bait station used it (85). Baiting can be effectively used
to describe patterns of swine movement, facilitate observations,
and improve the outcome of removal programs. Interestingly,
culling activities did not appear to greatly impact feral swine
movements.
In the event of a disease outbreak that affects swine (either
exclusively or in conjunction with other livestock species), feral

Feral Swine

The OIE defines feral animals as those that do not live under
human supervision or control but have a phenotype that was
selected by humans (77). Feral swine (Sus scrofa) include released
and escaped domestic swine, truly wild Eurasian boars, and their
hybrids and are believed to have been originally brought to the
United States in the 1400s (78). APHIS experts estimate that over
6 million feral swine roam within at least 35 states in the United
States with California, Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas having the
largest populations (Figure 5). In addition to being an invasive
species, feral swine can damage the environment and agricultural
operations; alter ecosystems with their rooting behavior that can
be detrimental to threatened and endangered species; and pose
a health threat to humans, domestic livestock, wildlife, and companion animals as a result of the type of pathogens that they are
capable of carrying and transmitting (79, 80). Studies involving
global positioning system (GPS) collared feral swine demonstrated that they contacted domestic swine, and digital images
indicated that feral swine attempted to enter pens containing
domestic female pigs (52). These types of interactions, which are
unsurprising because of the gregarious nature of both domestic
pigs and feral swine, increase the risk of pathogen transmission
events (81).

Figure 5 | Counties highlighted in blue within each state of the United States where feral swine have been found. (Figure courtesy by APHIS National Feral Swine
Damage Management Program.)
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swine could be problematic. Fencing types that can effectively
contain feral swine have been evaluated, and hog panels have
been found to be highly effective (86). These panels have been
found to be effective even when feral swine motivation to escape
is increased due to human intervention. In addition, they are
relatively quick and cheap to erect—both of which are crucial
components in the event of a disease outbreak. While fencing
shows promise, it is an option typically reserved for a small, localized scale, such as the area surrounding a single positive farm.
Knowledge derived from ecological and behavioral experi
ments would be employed, and information specific to the
infected premise would be utilized to make an informed decision regarding the frequency and nature of visitation between
domestic livestock and feral swine. This information would be
used in conjunction with data on other factors such as other
nutrient accessibility and feral swine densities (if density data are
available) to determine the appropriate spatial scale of fencing
or surveillance. Feral swine home ranges can vary dramatically
based on the habitat complexity and the availability of food,
water, and shelter. For example, a study on feral swine movement
in multiple regions of Texas found that the area used by GPS collared individuals could range from 4.5 to 22.23 km2 depending on
location and season (87). Fencing has been successfully used on
large scales to exclude feral swine from a national park in Hawaii
[>75 km (88)] and from a national monument in California
[42 km (89)], although these were erected over a time frame that
was longer than required for a typical outbreak situation. Fencing
can also be used to control movement. It is likely that a perimeter
fence would be erected around the infected premise with the
aim to enclose all feral swine that may have direct or indirect
contact with animals from the infected premise before targeted
removal of all feral swine within the fenced region. Culling
activities would likely be initiated immediately in an attempt to
contain disease transmission. Sounders and lone boars that live
outside, but near, the quarantine region would likely be closely
monitored to evaluate disease transmission and may be subject
to prophylactic culling. Outbreak specific characteristics would
be important to include, such as the amount of time that has
elapsed since the first case, the virulence of the ASFV strain, and
the density of both domestic and feral swine, among many other
components.
An ecological model developed in Europe showed that conventional wild boar management approaches such as banning feeding and targeted hunting of reproductively active females became
slowly effective over multiple generations (90). As such, a buffer of
100–200 km was necessary to compensate for the forward spread
of disease until the measures became effective. However, massive
population destruction (>80% of the population in the control
region within 4 months) or immediate removal of infectious carcasses reduced the buffer zone to <50 km. A hybrid approach of
the control methods would result in an intermediate buffer zone
width. Of note, hunting as a means to control population and
reduce the spread of ASF is very effective, but all efforts should
be made to reduce dispersal during this period as the gains made
in ASF control via population reduction can be quickly offset by
wild boar movement and subsequent introduction of ASFV into
naive populations (42).
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Controlling and/or eradicating disease outbreaks in feral or
wild populations is extremely difficult for a number of reasons.
Informed decision-making in the absence of knowledge or facts
is often required in these types of settings, and as such a systems
approach can be used to inform resource allocation and a systematic perspective (91). The publication by Delgado et al. (91) was
written with classical swine fever (CSF) in mind; however, many
of the components would likely be similar for ASF.
The United States is neighbored by two other countries, and
feral swine populations move back and forth between countries
on both the northern and southern borders. For example, it is not
known if a detailed census of feral swine populations throughout
Mexico has been done, but there are populations along the United
States–Mexico border that are contiguous with the US feral
swine population. Figure 6 shows the distribution of feral swine
in Mexico based on the subjective reports from the agriculture
department of each municipality. Feral swine have been seen
moving back and forth across the border along some stretches,
depending on the landscape. While both Mexico and Canada are
considered ASFV free, it still presents a concern that the borders
are porous allowing for movement of feral swine between the
countries along both borders. In the event of viral incursion in
the United States, Mexico, or Canada that spills over into the
feral swine population, this movement will present challenges
related to disease control and eradication. Semiquantitative risk
assessments have been developed to evaluate the risk of ASF
introduction into the EU by wild boar movements as ASF is now
considered endemic in much of Eastern Europe (92). In the event
of an ASFV introduction in either Canada or Mexico, this type
of modeling approach could be used to evaluate the risk of virus
introduction into the United States by feral swine.

Ornithodoros Ticks in North America

Tick families of veterinary and medical importance include
the Ixodidae, which are commonly known as hard ticks, and
Argasidae, which are commonly referred to as soft ticks. Several
soft tick species in the genus Ornithodoros are known vectors
of ASFV, and have a nidiculous lifestyle, which indicates their
preference to reside in the nest or burrow inhabited by their vertebrate hosts (93, 94). Their lifecycle involves immature and adult
male and female stages that take short, repeated blood meals (95).
Mated female soft ticks use the blood meal to produce eggs that
are laid in a suitable habitat. Adult Ornithodoros ticks can live
for several years without feeding, and their distribution tends to
overlap the geographic range of their hosts (76).
Five species of Ornithodoros ticks are found in the United
States. O. coriaceus, Ornithodoros hermsi, and O. parkeri occur
in the western and Midwestern regions of the United States and
O. turicata and Ornithodoros talaje are found in the arid regions
of the southern United States (10, 96). Laboratory investigations
reviewed by Kleiboeker and Scoles (33) demonstrated that
O. coriaceus, O. parkeri, and O. turicata were capable of becoming
infected with ASFV and O. coriaceus was competent in transmitting the virus to naive domestic swine. Of particular concern
is O. turicata, found in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah. These states
also provide suitable habitat for large numbers of feral swine,
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Figure 6 | Geographical distribution of feral swine in Mexico (2012): red = high density (>2,000 pigs/county), orange = moderate density (500–2,000 pigs/county),
and yellow = low density (<500 pigs/county). (Figure courtesy by APHIS National Feral Swine Damage Management Program.)

which presents an opportunity for the maintenance of ASFV by
O. turicata in the event of a viral incursion with the involvement
of feral swine (97).
Because of their short-feeding duration and nidiculous lifestyle, the global distributions of soft ticks can be challenging to
determine; however, their capacity to transmit pathogens makes
this information of the utmost importance. A regional model
using spatial multicriteria decision analysis to identify geographical areas that are suitable for specific species of Ornithodoros spp.
was created by Vial et al. (98). This model was developed for the
Western Palearctic region; although in the event of ASFV introduction into the United States, this methodology could be applied
to native Ornithodoros ticks to determine species and regions of
concern.
In addition to the competent Ornithodoros species found in
the United States, O. puertoricensis is found in the Caribbean,
specifically Jamaica, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and in
Panama (99) and can be infected with, and transmit, ASFV to
susceptible domestic swine (33). The porous border between
the United States and Mexico provides further complexity
in the event of an introduction of ASFV in either country,
and soft tick vectors could play a role as an epidemiological
bridge as they might be transported to disease-free regions. It
is important to note that although soft ticks engorge rapidly
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and tend to drop off their host after completion of the blood
meal, reports of host infestation as “stowaways,” including feral
swine, captured outside of their nest or burrow has occurred
(100, 101). Thus, this potential route of viral introduction
or spread is worth mentioning. Furthermore, they are often
promiscuous in their host preferences and have occasionally
been recovered from birds, which also pose a risk for disease
translocation (10).

CONCLUDING REMARKS
African swine fever virus introduction (either accidental or
purposeful) to the United States could cause severe morbidity
and mortality in domestic swine. Furthermore, the trade implications associated with ASFV in domestic swine are substantial and
could severely affect the pork industry. The current regulatory
systems in place for the importation of live animals, animal
products, byproducts, and feed are comprehensive, involving
considerable Federal oversight and encompassing information
relevant to the country of origin, the product to be imported,
and the species involved must conform to research methods that
effectively demonstrate the deactivation of ASFV. Despite the
robust regulatory framework, the illegal importation of animals
and their products is in its very nature difficult to control, manage,
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or regulate. Semiquantitative approaches can be used to evaluate
the risk of disease introduction via the illegal importation of
pork and pork products, and modeling in the European Union
suggests that this channel certainly serves as a risk for ASFV
importation and subsequent introduction (102). Bioterrorism is
another potential route of introduction. Given the complexities of
preventing accidental or purposeful ASFV introduction into the
United States, vigilant observance of domestic livestock and rapid
reporting and differential diagnosis are necessary in the event of a
disease detection in pigs. Channels for rapid communication and
diagnostics already exist through state and national veterinarians
and laboratories as evidenced by a pilot study in which samples
were collected from culled feral swine and evaluated for the presence of ASFV. The evaluation of samples for ASFV suggests that
labs are proficient in diagnostic techniques necessary for viral
detection.
African swine fever virus introduction, or spillover, into
feral swine populations would heavily complicate eradication.
Furthermore, unrestricted movement of feral swine across porous
borders presents a challenge in the event of an ASFV incursion
into any countries that share borders. The presence of competent
biological vectors, Ornithodoros ticks, further complicates the
control and eradication of ASFV upon introduction to a new
region. These ticks are often long lived and are believed to play
an important role in viral maintenance and may contribute to
the development of endemicity in a specific region. O. coriaceus,
O. parkeri, and O. turicata are present in the United States and
have been found to be capable of ASFV infection and in the case
of O. coriaceus, ticks are capable of transmitting the virus to susceptible swine (33, 96). Ornithodoros dugesi are found in Texas
and northern Mexico, and O. talaje are found in the southern
United States; however, neither species has been evaluated for its
competence as a biological vector for ASFV. Further laboratory
studies should be designed to evaluate the ability for O. dugesi
and O. talaje to become infected with various strains of ASFV and
to characterize the ability for O. parkeri and O. turicata as well as
O. dugesi and O. talaje, pending their capacity to become
infected, to transmit infection to susceptible domestic swine.
In addition, expanded analyses to explore the distribution of
competent Ornithodoros ticks in relation to dense commercial
pig production regions as well as high populations of feral
swine are needed. Moreover, determining host preferences for
competent vector species is important to characterize risk. The
lack of a vaccine for ASFV makes disease control and eradication substantially more difficult, and as such, efficacious vaccine
development is a high priority. Characterization of antigenic
viral proteins that contribute to a host immune response and a
determination of immune mechanisms that lead to protection
are extremely important and foundational for the quest of a
vaccine.
Currently, the United States does not have any active surveillance protocols for ASF in domestic or feral swine. The risk of
introduction is believed to be low because the disease is not currently present in the western hemisphere. In addition, the introduction of ASFV into a naive population is typically accompanied
by severe mortality such that passive surveillance, sampling of
dead pigs, would likely be sufficient to detect an ASFV incursion
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(103, 104). Importantly, during calendar year 2017, the Foreign
Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) at Plum Island
Animal Disease Center performed only two cases requesting
ASF testing and both were negative (Personal communication).
Of note, however, a stochastic model used to evaluate transmission of ASFV within a population found that the virus may be
circulating in a herd for several weeks before a marked increase
in mortality is observed, which limits the usefulness of mortality
data as a means of early detection in an outbreak scenario (105). It
may also be useful to compare the conditions in the United States
to those in Europe to determine whether the buffer zones necessary to quell an ASF outbreak in Europe (90) would be similar to
those required for an outbreak in the United States.
USDA Veterinary Services have outlined a surveillance pro
gram for CSFV in domestic swine that could be harnessed to
evaluate ASFV in the event the risk of introduction increases.
The objectives are as follows: (1) surveillance for rapid detection
of CSFV in US swine, (2) monitor the risk of introduction of CSF
into US swine, (3) surveillance of international CSF status, and
(4) surveillance to document freedom of CSF (71). Unthrifty pigs,
considered to be those that gain weight poorly or are otherwise
somewhat sickly, are often sold to off-market vendors. APHIS
Veterinary Services field staff or other cooperating personnel
collect tonsil samples in these markets as a way to survey for
infectious agents, including CSFV. This method is deemed to be
an effective surveillance strategy as poor-doing pigs from surrounding regions are often consolidated in these markets, which
makes for an efficient means of sampling sickly pigs from a wider
geographical area. Furthermore, high-risk areas, designated by
APHIS as regions with garbage feeding operations, backyard
swine operations, feral swine hunting clubs, military bases, international air or sea ports, farming operations utilizing an international labor force, and/or corporations engaging in international
swine movement, are subject to active surveillance protocols via
tonsil collection; 25 states are considered high risk. All garbage
feeder operations in the United States are licensed and regularly
inspected, and heat treatment of all feed is mandatory. Texas and
Florida are considered particularly high risk, and as such, two
swine slaughter establishments in Florida and three in Texas
randomly collect blood, which is sent to the FADDL for further
testing, especially from pigs in the southern portion of each state,
light-weight pigs, or those in transition. This active surveillance
for CSFV in domestic swine could readily be extended to include
surveillance for ASFV as samples are already being collected and
transported to FADDL for screening purposes.
Moreover, feral swine are also surveyed as a preventative and
early sentinel in the event of a CSFV intrusion. For fiscal year
2017, USDA APHIS National Feral Swine Damage Management
Program is rolling out a targeted surveillance plan in which
existing feral swine populations, domestic hog production areas,
and landfills are used as criteria for determining priority of feral
swine samples collected for disease surveillance. Counties are
weighted based on the presence or absence of each of the aforementioned criteria. This type of targeted surveillance is crucial to
allow for the efficient use of time and resources and to increase
the probability of detecting an outbreak early (106, 107). Samples
are collected via culling operations as well as from hunter-killed
14
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pigs, and serology is performed to evaluate the presence of
CSFV antibodies. Again, expanding this program to include
ASFV screening in feral swine may be beneficial, especially if the
perceived risk of ASFV entering the United States increases, as it
would likely contribute to early detection in the event of a viral
incursion and would be far less costly than an ASFV-exclusive
active surveillance protocol.
Importantly, several strains of Ornithodoros soft ticks are
found in regions with high feral swine populations, especially
Texas, Florida, and Oklahoma (O. turicata) and California
(O. coriaceus). Both of these tick species have been shown
to become infected with ASFV and O. coriaceus is capable of
transmitting the virus to susceptible domestic swine >500 days
after infection (33). Ornithodoros ticks are permissive to ASFV
infection with varying capacities for infection; thus, it is hypothesized that other Ornithodoros species ticks found in the United
States are competent ASFV vectors. The high density of feral
and domestic swine in these regions and a strong likelihood for
overlapping distribution with potential soft tick vectors further
the notion that an active surveillance protocol may be useful and
contribute to early detection in the event that ASFV emerges in
the United States.
It is important to note that much of the spread of ASF through
Eastern Europe and the Caucuses region is likely driven by
anthropogenic factors, such as the movement of infected pigs and
their products as well as via swill feeding (108). However, ticks
cannot be overlooked as they are believed to have maintained
ASFV in Portugal over a 6-year period during which time the
country was declared ASF free prior to the re-emergence of the
disease on a single farm (48). The role of vectors in pathogen
maintenance and transmission events is often poorly understood,
and these long-lived ticks may play a crucial role in conjunction
with human activities which likely facilitate ASFV spread.
Sampling of illegally imported and subsequently confiscated,
suids, and their products would also provide meaningful data
relevant to the types of pathogens being imported. The General
Accounting Office (74) estimated that 1–3% of illegally imported
wildlife carried by passengers was detected and 1–10% of illegally
imported wildlife in declared cargo shipments. Smith et al. (109)
performed a pilot study evaluating zoonotic agents in confiscated animal products from John F. Kennedy airport in New
York, New York, and found that multiple strains of retroviruses
and herpesviruses were present in several non-human primate
specimens. Knowledge relative to the types of pathogens entering
the United States in illegally imported swine products would be
useful in understanding risk of both swine-specific pathogens
and zoonotic organisms.

African swine fever presents a substantial threat to both
domestic and wild suid species. The concern of viral introduction in the United States has contributed to the implementation
of a series of preventive measures designed for importation of
live animals and their products. Despite extensive research,
knowledge gaps exist, and they have been highlighted as areas for
future evaluation.
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